

# Lecture 10: Cross-Sectional Analysis – Aggregation

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# The aggregation problem

- Last time we characterized the estimand of typical **cross-sectional regressions**
- We saw that there's an issue—the **“aggregation/missing intercept” problem**
  - Estimand of micro experiment is a direct (“partial equilibrium”) response, and so free of the general equilibrium effects that enter the full response  $\ominus$   
Why missing intercept? looking across agents absorbs common aggregate effects = enters fixed effect in cross-sectional regression on aggregate shock
  - Concrete example: direct response to lump-sum stimulus check misses tax financing, price effects (interest rates, relative goods prices), Keynesian multiplier, ...
- This lecture will discuss **two possible solutions**: [illustrate both for stimulus check application]
  1. Macro as explicitly aggregated micro
  2. Different shocks share identical GE effects (e.g., a common “demand multiplier”)

# Roadmap

- We'll begin by formalizing the **aggregation problem**

- Using sequence-space techniques: you can generally write

$$\text{total causal effect} = \text{micro estimate} + \text{GE effects}$$

- We will illustrate this decomposition in a model of stimulus checks. Will be straightforward to see that such decompositions are very general.

- We will then discuss our two **solution strategies**

- Both will have a similar flavor: use model structure to arrive at results of the form

$$\text{total causal effect} = \text{micro estimate} + \text{something that is (cleanly?) measurable}$$

- The approaches will differ in how much model structure is imposed/how easy the measurement part is

# Outline

1. The Aggregation Problem

2. Solutions

Macro As Explicitly Aggregated Micro  
Commonality in GE: “Demand Equivalence”

3. Class Summary

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# A model of stimulus checks [Wolf (2022)]

- The next slide will provide a brief sketch of a **rich structural GE model**
  - Model blocks: heterogeneous households [“HANK”], heterogeneous firms [Khan-Thomas, Ottonello-Winberry], fiscal & monetary policy
  - Solution method: linearization + perfect foresight [= sequence-space]
  - Policy experiment: date-0 stimulus check, financed with future taxes
- In the context of this lecture the **purpose of the model** is twofold:
  1. First: provide an explicit worked-out example of the decomposition
$$\text{total causal effect} = \text{micro estimate} + \text{GE effects}$$
  2. Later: formally justify our two approaches to solving the aggregation problem

# A model of stimulus checks [Wolf (2022)]

## 1. Households

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^t u(c_{it}, \ell_{it}) \right] \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & c_{it} + b_{it} = w_t \ell_{it} \mathbf{e}_{it} + \boldsymbol{\tau}_t + \frac{1 + i_{t-1}^b}{1 + \pi_t} b_{it-1} + d_t \end{aligned}$$

+ borr. constraint  $b_{it} \geq \underline{b}$  &  $\ell_{it}$  is demand-determined (= **wage-NKPC**)

## 2. Production: $\approx$ canonical heterogeneous-firm model, e.g. see Ottonello-Winberry (2021)

$$\max \quad \mathbb{E}_0 \left[ \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \left( \prod_{s=0}^{t-1} \frac{1 + \pi_s}{1 + r_{s-1}^b} \right) d_{jt} \right]$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad d_{jt} = p_t^l y(z_{jt}, k_{jt-1}, \ell_{jt}) - w_t \ell_{jt} - [k_{jt} - (1 - \delta) k_{jt-1}] - \text{adj. costs} - b_{jt} + \frac{1 + i_{t-1}^b}{1 + \pi_t} b_{jt-1}$$

+ fin. constraints on  $\{b_{jt}^f, d_{jt}^l\}$  & output is demand-determined (= **price-NKPC**)

## 3. Government: spend & tax, set nominal rate (debt & monetary rules)

# A PE-GE decomposition

- **Objective:** find aggregate causal effects of a transfer stimulus policy
  - Policy details: transfer path  $\boldsymbol{\tau}^x = \boldsymbol{\tau}^x(\varepsilon_\tau)$  sent out to all households, financed with some (uniform) future tax path  $\boldsymbol{\tau}^e = \boldsymbol{\tau}^e(\varepsilon_\tau)$ , total taxes/transfers are  $\boldsymbol{\tau} = \boldsymbol{\tau}^x + \boldsymbol{\tau}^e$
  - Preview: will later also look at gov't spending shock  $\boldsymbol{g} = \boldsymbol{g}(\varepsilon_g)$  (+ tax financing)
- Our key tool for formalizing the aggregation problem will be a **PE-GE** decomposition of the household consumption-savings decision: [as usual: use sequence-space cons. function]

$$\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau \equiv \mathbf{c}(\mathbf{p}_\tau, \boldsymbol{\tau}_\tau^x) - \mathbf{c}(\bar{\mathbf{p}}, \bar{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x)$$

- Notation: bars = steady state, hats & subscripts = IRFs, boldface = time paths
- HH's receive **transfer**  $\boldsymbol{\tau}^x$  and face **GE feedback**  $\mathbf{p}$  ( $\mathbf{i}_b$ ,  $\boldsymbol{\pi}$ ,  $\mathbf{w}$ , tax financing  $\boldsymbol{\tau}^e$ , ...)



# A PE-GE decomposition

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$$\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{c}}(\bar{\mathbf{p}}, \hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}_\tau^x)}_{\text{PE impact: } \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{PE}} + \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{c}}(\hat{\mathbf{p}}_\tau, \bar{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x)}_{\text{GE feedback: } \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{GE}}$$

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# Interpreting micro estimands

- We already discussed that **cross-sectional data** can give **“PE” effects**:
  - Let  $\varepsilon_{\tau it} = \xi_{\tau it} \times \varepsilon_{\tau t}$  ( $\xi_{\tau it}$  is iid), and consider a cross-sectional regression of the form

$$c_{it+h} = \alpha_i + \delta_t + \beta_{\tau h} \times \varepsilon_{\tau it} + u_{it+h}, \quad h = 0, 1, 2, \dots$$

- Then the OLS estimand of  $\beta_{\tau} \equiv (\beta_{\tau 0}, \beta_{\tau 1}, \dots)'$  satisfies

$$\beta_{\tau} \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \int_0^1 \frac{\partial \mathbf{c}_i}{\partial \varepsilon_{\tau 0}} di \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}^{PE}$$

- Here I'm using heterogeneous exposure to an agg. shock [as in Johnson-Parker-Souleles]. Last time we instead used shocks w/o aggregate effects [notably, lottery wins]. Both give  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}^{PE}$ .
- **Aggregation problem**: how do we go from the estimable  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}^{PE}$  to  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}$ ?
  - In general we are missing the GE term  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}^{GE}$ . Can use  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau}^{PE}$  only if the GE term is zero (= units without a direct treatment show no overall response)
  - “Missing intercept”: GE effects that are orthogonal to treatment heterogeneity  $\varepsilon_{\tau it}$  are necessarily differenced out [when regressing on an aggregate shock]

# A more general discussion

- This approach to **PE-GE** decompositions & aggregation is very general
  - Consider some general outcome of interest  $x$ . Suppose  $x$  is directly affected by a shock  $\epsilon$  and GE “prices”  $p$ . Assume in sequence-space you can write

$$x = \mathcal{X}(\epsilon, p)$$

- Then we get the decomposition

$$\hat{x} = \underbrace{\mathcal{X}_\epsilon \times \epsilon}_{\text{PE impact}} + \underbrace{\mathcal{X}_p \times \hat{p}}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

- Can easily see how investment subject to tax incentives  $q$  fits into this:

$$\hat{i} = \mathcal{I}_q \times \hat{q} + \mathcal{I}_w \times \hat{w} + \mathcal{I}_r \times \hat{r} + \dots$$

- **Limitation:** assumes price-taking behavior

# Other examples

Many other **famous cross-sectional studies** face the same problem:

1. Regional vs. aggregate fiscal multipliers  
Nakamura & Steinsson, Chodorow-Reich
2. China shock (regional import competition & employment)  
Autor, Dorn & Hansen
3. Bank lending cuts to firms  
Chodorow-Reich, Herreño
4. Consumption responses to stock market gains  
Chodorow-Reich, Nenov & Simsek
5. ...

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3. Class Summary

What are possible strategies for solving the aggregation problem?

- Standard approach: match micro estimate in **fully specified structural model**, then use that model for aggregation

Often not easy to see: what features of the model matter for **PE-GE** mapping?

- Recently popular **semi-structural** alternative: impose enough structure so that the “missing intercept” (e.g.,  $\hat{c}_\tau^{GE}$ ) becomes directly measurable
- I’ll here review two examples of this, both for the **stimulus check application**:
  - a) Consider a model in which the micro estimates at the same time also pin down  $\hat{c}_\tau^{GE}$  (“macro as explicitly aggregated micro”) Auclert, Rognlie & Straub (2018)
  - b) Consider a model in which more readily available time series evidence on other shocks simultaneously pins down  $\hat{c}_\tau^{GE}$  (“commonality in GE”) Wolf (2022)

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# Aggregation via the IKC

- Our model so far was quite rich: capital, firm-level financial frictions, general monetary rule, partially flexible prices & wages, ...
- Let's now simplify to return to the **IKC model** from last lecture:
  - Adapted to today's notation, the equilibrium path  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau$  solves

$$\mathcal{C}_y \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau + \mathcal{C}_\tau (\hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x + \hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^e) = \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau$$

- Thus we have

$$\begin{aligned}\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{PE} &= \mathcal{C}_\tau \hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x \\ \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{GE} &= [I - \mathcal{C}_y]^{-1} \mathcal{C}_\tau (\hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x + \hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^e) - \mathcal{C}_\tau \hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x\end{aligned}$$

- The direct effect is  $\mathcal{C}_\tau \times \hat{\boldsymbol{\tau}}^x$ . But micro data can (in principle) get all of  $\mathcal{C}_y/\mathcal{C}_\tau$  and so (through the model structure) the full GE counterfactual

Interpretation:  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau$  will reflect (i) direct effect, (ii) fiscal financing rule, and (iii) Keynesian GE multiplier



## Aside: getting all of $\mathcal{C}_y/\mathcal{C}_\tau$

- Empirical evidence so far: mostly on first column of  $\mathcal{C}_y/\mathcal{C}_\tau$ 
  - Main takeaway: households on average *gradually* spend (small) lump-sum income receipts  
Fagereng-Holm-Natvik (2020)
- What about the rest? limited empirical evidence, but strong theoretical predictions  
See Wolf (2022). Shape obtains in OLG & bond-in-utility. HANK is just slightly different ...

$$\mathcal{C}_\tau \approx \omega \times \begin{pmatrix} 1 & \frac{\theta}{1+\bar{r}} & \left(\frac{\theta}{1+\bar{r}}\right)^2 & \cdots \\ \theta & 1 & \frac{\theta}{1+\bar{r}} & \cdots \\ \theta^2 & \theta & 1 & \cdots \\ \vdots & \vdots & \vdots & \ddots \end{pmatrix}$$

Note the  $\approx$ . In fact MPCs along the main diagonal decline somewhat, reflecting anticipation.

- Given (i) first column (from data) + (ii) model extrapolation for rest of  $\mathcal{C}_\tau/\mathcal{C}_y$  + (iii) as'n of IKC model structure we can recover  $\hat{\mathcal{C}}_\tau$  for *any* stimulus check policy

# Discussion

- + Reduce aggregation problem to **micro measurement exercise**
  - All macro identifying assumptions are embedded in the model. Conditional on that, we only need **PE matrices**, estimable from micro data alone
  - Note: micro experiments both give the **direct effect** and the way to **aggregate it**
- Approach requires very **strong restrictions on the model**
  - Recall the **simplifying assumptions**: no capital, no firm borrowing frictions, single asset, single final good, monetary authority that fixes the real rate (and issues real bonds), ...
- Actually the micro measurement exercise is still too hard, thus **still need model**
  - Micro data are enough to get first column of  $\mathcal{C}_\tau$  and  $\mathcal{C}_y$ , then need **extrapolation** via HA consumption-savings problem for rest of the matrices

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# Commonality in GE

- Could we use empirical evidence on the **aggregate effects of shock/policy A** to learn about the **missing GE effects** for some micro study on **policy B**?

Could be useful if A is somehow easier to analyze than B in the aggregate time series ...

- Less abstractly: the CBO actually uses a variant of this idea for “**demand shocks**”
  - Micro causal variation can tell us how much stimulus checks/bonus depreciation stimulate “demand” (consumer spending/firm investment expenditure)
  - Time series literature has identified aggregate multipliers of gov’t spending increases

  
can we just combine the two?

- Remainder of this lecture: formalize this idea in the general model from before, discuss implementation details, assess generality & limitations [closely following Wolf (2022)]

# Identification result

## Proposition (“demand equivalence”)

Return to the general model from before, and consider a policy  $\epsilon_{\tau}$ . Suppose that:

A1 ...

A2 ...

A3 ...

If a fiscal spending policy shock  $\epsilon_g$  is s.t. (i)  $\hat{g}_g = \hat{c}_{\tau}^{PE}$  and (ii)  $\hat{\tau}_g^e = \hat{\tau}_{\tau}^e$ , then, to first order,

$$\hat{c}_{\tau} = \underbrace{\hat{c}_{\tau}^{PE}}_{PE \text{ response}} + \underbrace{\hat{c}_g}_{GE \text{ feedback}}$$

# Identification result

## Proposition (“demand equivalence”)

Return to the general model from before, and consider a policy  $\epsilon_\tau$ . Suppose that:

A1 Households and gov’t consume a **common final good**.

*This assumption has no bite in our model since it only features one good anyway. I’m stating it just to make clear the importance of this restriction.*

A2 Households and gov’t borrow and lend at **identical rates**.

*This assumption has no bite in our model since there is only one asset. Again just stating for emphasis.*

A3 There are **no wealth effects** in labor supply and/or wages are fully **rigid**.

If a fiscal spending policy shock  $\epsilon_g$  is s.t. (i)  $\hat{g}_g = \hat{c}_\tau^{PE}$  and (ii)  $\hat{\tau}_g^e = \hat{\tau}_\tau^e$ , then, to first order,

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{c}_\tau^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\hat{c}_g}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

# Proof sketch [see Wolf (2021) for details]

- Equilibrium = solution to many mkt-clearing conditions + other restrictions  
[output, gov't budget, asset markets, labor, equity valuation, asset arbitrage, Taylor rule, ...]

$$\underbrace{\mathbf{H}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})}_{\text{full equilibrium system}} = \mathbf{0}$$

- Proof strategy: identical **excess demand/supply** in all markets

A1 **Output**: by property (i), identical demand pressure for common final good

$$\mathbf{c}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) + \mathbf{g}(\boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) = \mathbf{y}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) - \mathbf{i}(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$$

A2 **Gov't budget**: by property (ii), identical tax financing for transfers & gov't spending


$$\boldsymbol{\tau}^e = \boldsymbol{\tau}^e(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$$

A3 **Labor**: no shift in labor supply/shift is irrelevant

$$\boldsymbol{\ell}^h(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon}) = \boldsymbol{\ell}^f(\mathbf{p}; \boldsymbol{\varepsilon})$$

# Numerical illustration


Let's now see this result in action in a sticky-wage HANK model ...






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Let's now see this result in action in a sticky-wage HANK model ...



We can leverage this result to operationalize the CBO intuition ...

# Measurement inputs

Result suggests that we can combine **cross-sectional** and **time-series** measurement:

## 1. **Cross-sectional** identification

$$\beta_{\tau} \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \int_0^1 \frac{\partial c_i}{\partial \varepsilon_{\tau 0}} di \times \varepsilon_{\tau t} = \hat{c}_{\tau}^{PE}$$

## 2. Fiscal **time series** experiments

- We have seen several time series approaches to identifying fiscal spending shocks and so estimating  $\hat{c}_g$ . E.g.: (i) narrative, (ii) forecast errors, (iii) timing/exclusion restrictions Blanchard-Perotti (2002), Mountford-Uhlig (2009), Ramey (2011), Caldara-Kamps (2017), ...
- Summary: most estimates lie “in a fairly narrow range, 0.6 to 1” Ramey (2018)

combine them to arrive at  $\hat{c}_{\tau}$

# Matching experiments

**Challenge:** necessary condition to combine experiments is identical net excess demand —  $\hat{\mathbf{g}}_g = \hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{PE}$ . Given  $\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{PE}$ , how can we find the required gov't spending shock?

- Natural approach: look for best **linear combination**
  - Suppose time series analysis has identified several shocks with paths  $\hat{\mathbf{g}}_{g_k}$ . Projection:

$$\hat{\mathbf{c}}_\tau^{PE} = \sum_{k=1}^{n_k} \gamma_k \times \hat{\mathbf{g}}_{g_k} + \text{error}$$

- Then

$$\sum_{k=1}^{n_k} \gamma_k \times \hat{\mathbf{c}}_{g_k}$$

promises to capture general equilibrium effects *up to the error term*

- Note that this is the same multi-shock idea as what we used for policy rule counterfactuals

# Implementation & interpretation


- Suppose you have ensured that  $\hat{g}_g = \hat{c}_\tau^{PE}$ . Now construct

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{c}_\tau^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\sum_{k=1}^{n_k} \gamma_k}_{\text{GE feedback}} \times \hat{c}_{g_k} \quad (1)$$

How should we interpret (1)? Valid **GE** counterfactual for stimulus check shock  $\varepsilon_\tau$  s.t.:

- $\varepsilon_\tau$  and  $\varepsilon_g$  are associated with the same movements in taxes (recall: condition (ii) in th'm)  
E.g. for stimulus check policy: same financing rule
- $\varepsilon_\tau$  and  $\varepsilon_g$  occur in the same macro environment (same policy regime, cyclical state, ...)  
Why? recall that th'm used (log-)linearization

# Application: PE demand




- Cross-sectional identification

[Parker-Souleles-Johnson-McClelland (2013)]

- Experiment: one-off stimulus checks (around \$600 per household)
- Find: strong, very short-lived response (here: extrapolated from  $t = 2$  onwards)

# Application: PE demand



- Cross-sectional identification


[Parker-Souleles-Johnson-McClelland (2013)]

- Experiment: one-off stimulus checks (around \$600 per household)
- Find: strong, very short-lived response (here: extrapolated from  $t = 2$  onwards)

- Time series identification [Ramey (2011)]

- Identification as 'n': forecast errors as IV
- Find: short-lived uptick in  $g$ , deficit-financed, muted interest rate response

# Application: GE counterfactual




- Aggregate via demand equivalence:

$$\hat{\mathbf{c}}_{\tau} = \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{c}}_d^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\hat{\mathbf{c}}_g}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$



# Application: GE counterfactual



- Aggregate via demand equivalence:

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \underbrace{\hat{c}_d^{PE}}_{\text{PE response}} + \underbrace{\hat{c}_g}_{\text{GE feedback}}$$

- Main result: strong impact stimulus with

$$\text{full C response} \approx \text{micro estimate}$$

- Interpretation: same conclusion in *any* model s.t.:
  - demand equivalence holds
  - micro & macro moments are matched

How should we interpret these results?

- So far: valid counterfactuals for *any model* that satisfies **demand equivalence**  
demand equivalence + cross-sectional & time series moments from literature  $\Rightarrow$  our results (= “sufficient statistics” in public finance)
- But the required assumptions are of course quite **strong**
- **Q:** what does it look like in models that break exact demand equivalence?
  - **A:** probably miss some GE crowding-out = upward-biased [► Details](#)

# Discussion

- + Applies for a large **space of models**
  - Allows for **investment** (+ very general firm block) & **general monetary rule**, though still requires single good & no borrowing frictions
- + Implementable purely through **empirical measurement**
  - **Not always applicable**
    - Need to find experiments so that **net excess demand paths are aligned**
    - Works only for demand shocks, so **not a general-purpose aggregation methodology**
  - Need to **trust time series evidence** for a different shock
    - Requires relatively greater confidence in time series estimates for **fiscal spending experiment** than the **demand shock of interest**


# Appendix

# Demand equivalence: accuracy

- Idea: in models that **break equivalence** compute the plim of aggregation procedure
  1. Estimated HANK model [Smets-Wouters (2007) + Kaplan-Moll-Violante (2018)]  
Note: breaks equivalence *only* via labor assumption
  2. Further extensions that jointly break as's 1-3
- **Main result:** miss some **GE crowding-out**

► back

# Estimated HANK Model



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
- Estimate HANK model, solve at posterior mode  
[Results similar across the posterior distribution](#) [▶ Details](#)
- First finding: nearly exact in rich estimated model
- What's going on?

- Equivalence fails *only* due to labor channel

$$\hat{c}_\tau = \hat{c}_\tau^{PE} + \hat{c}_g + \text{error}(\hat{\ell}_\tau^{PE})$$

- But wages are quite sticky ( $\phi_w = 0.6$ )
- Well-known: for transitory fluctuations, with sticky prices/wages, labor wedge shocks matter little  
[Christiano \(2011, 2012\)](#), [Auclert et al. \(2020\)](#)

# Further extensions




- For several further model variants compute

$$\text{error} = \frac{(c_{\tau}^{PE} + c_g) - c_{\tau}}{c_{\tau,0}}$$

- Check violations of each key assumption:

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# Further extensions



- For several further model variants compute


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- Check violations of each key assumption:  
A1 flexible wages & alternative preferences

► back



# Further extensions



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
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
A1 flexible wages & alternative preferences

A2 multiple goods, gov't investment

A3 multiple assets, small open economy

► back

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
A2 multiple goods, gov't investment

A3 multiple assets, small open economy

main message: approximation is biased *up*

► back

# Further extensions



► back

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- Check violations of each key assumption:

A1 flexible wages & alternative preferences

A2 multiple goods, gov't investment

A3 multiple assets, small open economy

main message: approximation is biased *up*

- But: bound likely to be tight for checks  
small & transitory, little evidence of labor adjustment,  
do not use gov't investment, ...